Missing In Action
By Alan Stoga*

The deadly fall-out from the Iraq war has many consequences. Anti-Americanism is on the rise. U.S. self confidence is starting to wane. The country's willingness to define its mission globally and to act on that mission coherently is weakening. Nervousness about the direction of the world economy is increasing, despite evidence that the U.S. recovery is actually becoming more solid. Financial markets are increasingly being buffeted by high oil prices caused by the chaos in the Middle East.

All of this seems remote from Latin America. However, the almost inevitable corollary of what is going on in the Middle East is that the United States has less and less time for Latin America. Iraq matters because it is driving Latin America off the U.S. map.

Certainly, this is the perception of many Latin political and business leaders. They see a U.S. regional policy that consists of little more than crisis management in Haiti, military support for President Uribe's war against narco-guerillas, and a seemingly endless parade of proposals for bilateral free trade agreements — which may or may not have the ultimate support of the Congress. At regional summits and in bilateral meetings they get lectured about ending corruption, solicited to send troops to the "war" against terrorism, and leaned on to defend U.S. causes at the United Nations. And they are berated when Washington senses a lack of enthusiasm for its dictates.

Unfortunately, today these leaders rarely sees the Bush Administration speaking out effectively against abuses of democracy in the region, offering real support for leaders who try to implement good economic policies in the face of populist opposition, or pushing the international financial organizations to work creatively with countries that are being left behind by the globalizing world economy. And, since they don't see the U.S. willing to lead anywhere interesting, most Latin countries are not willing to follow.

Washington's approach to Latin America is failing, because it lacks an organizing principle — a "big idea." Too many countries in the region do not know what the Bush Administration wants, in large part because the U.S. has failed to articulate a strategy that extends much beyond slogans about "the war on terror" and "free trade." But these are means, not ends: fighting terror and promoting free trade are at best paths towards the economic growth and stable democratic development that Latin Americans want.

Of course, that was the idea underlying the now discredited "Washington consensus:" a belief that the United States should be in the business of promoting democracy and growth in the part of the globe most essential to its own security. That was a big enough idea, even if the policy proposals were inadequate. Clearly, the goals should be the same today, backed by a renewed sense of urgency and purpose. Instead, Washington offers only the rhetoric of terror and trade, which is not enough to overcome the sense that President Bush does not really care enough about Latin America to put real resources — or real ideas — to work. This is particularly evident in the Andean region where the political, social, and security crisis seems to grow every day, and where the United States is largely missing from action.

Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru appear on the edge of political collapse. Their presidents lack popular legitimacy; their governments face hostile Congresses; and the risk of street violence — which has claimed many lives and several presidents in the recent past — is continually rising. The face-off in Venezuela between President Chavez and his many opponents gets tenser every day as the government maneuvers to avoid a referendum that could force Chavez from office with increasingly spectacular tactics, seemingly secure in the belief that the U.S. need for oil will protect him from Washington's censure. And, even though Colombia has made measurable progress against the guerillas, a top U.N. official recently declared the country "the biggest humanitarian catastrophe of the Western Hemisphere."

To make a series of bad situations even worse, these national developments are increasingly interconnected by populism, drug money, and terrorism. Although there is growing evidence that Venezuelan and even Cuban agents are helping to spread the cancer, to some extent the regionalization of instability is an unintended consequence of Plan Colombia. The harder Uribe's government pushes the guerillas, the more the conflict spills into neighboring countries. While Washington scores this as a victory in its playbook, all that is changing is the locus, not the nature, of the threat.

Of course, Andean failings are not Washington's fault. But, sooner or later, they will be Washington's problems, if only because the United States cannot afford real instability so close to its own shores. Hopefully, it will simply take the belated recognition that U.S. security inevitably starts in the Americas — and not lost American lives or nationalized American assets — to change today's short sighted approach to Latin America.

* Alan Stoga is president of Zemi Communications.